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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination.
It asserts (in the most common form) that the exchange rate change between two
currencies over any period of time is determined by the change in the two
countries' relative price levels. Because the theory singles out price level
changes as the overriding determinant of exchange rate movements it has also
been called the "inflation theory of exchange rates".
ThePPPtheory of exchange rates has somewhat the same status in the
history of economic thought and in economic policy as the Quantity Theory of
Money (QT): by different authors and at different points in time it has been
considered an identity, a truism, an empirical regularity or a grossly
misleading simplification. The theory remains controversial, as does the QT,
because strict versions are demonstrably wrong while soft versions deprive it
of any useful content. In between there is room for theory and empirical
evidence to specify the circumstances under which and the extent to which PPP
provides a useful though not exact description of exchange rate behavior.
The analogy with the QT holds particularly in the effects of monetary
disturbances. The analor with the QT holds particularly in the effects of
*kj article prepared for the New Paigrave Dictionary of Economics. I am
indebted to Susan Collins, Stanley Pischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Dale Henderson,
IrvingKravis, Paul Samuelson and John Williamson for suggestions and
comments.2
monetary disturbances. The QT fails to hold exactly when disturbances are
primarily monetary, for instance in the course of hynerinfletions, because
changes in the expected rate of inflation generate systematic movements in
velocity that break the one to one link between money and prices.In the same
way, monetary disturbances cause exchange rate movements that at least
temporarily deviate from PPP, implying changes in the exchange rate adjusted
relative price levels or "real" exchange rates. It is true that when the
economy, following a major monetary disturbance, has settled down again the
cumulative changes in money, prices and the exchange rate will tend to be the
same or at least close.In that sense PPP holds. The same is decidely not
true, however, in the course of the disturbance.
And in the long run, just as changes in real income or financial
innovation bring about trend changes in velocity that destroy the one to one
relationship between the money supply and prices, there are also trend
deviations from PPP: productivity growth differentials between countries, for
example, lead to trend changes in real exchange rates.
1. Statement of the Theory
Let and p represent the price of the ith commodity at home and abroad,
stated in home and foreign currency respectively, and e the exchange rate. The
exchange rate is quoted in the American manner as the number of units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign money. Further let P and P* be the price
level at home and abroad quoted in the respective currencies. -
Thestrong or absolute version of PPP relies on the "law of one price" in
an integrated, competitive market. Abstracting from all and any frictions the
price of a given good will be the same in all locations when quoted in the same
currency, say dollars: =ep.Consider now a domestic price index P =3
f(p1 anda foreign price index P* =(*1,..p*.,..p*). If the
prices of each good, in dollars, are equalized across countries, and if the
same goods enter each country's market basket with the same weights (i.e. the
homogenous—of--degree-ofle g(.) aridf(.)functions are the same) then absolute
PPP prevails. The law of one price in this special case extends not only to
individual goods but also to aggregate price levels. Spatial arbitrage then
takes the form of the strox or absolute version of PPP:
(i) e = $priceof a standard market basket of foods
£ price of the same standard basket
where the right hand side is the common multiple of the price of each good in
one currency and in the other. Specifically if k for all i we then
have eP/P*k. Note now the implication of absolute PPP. Whatever the
monetary or real disturbances in the economy because of instantaneous, costless
arbitrage the prices of a common market basket of goods in the two countries,
measured in a common currency will be the same or P/eP* =1at all times.
There can be no objection to (1) as a theoretical statement. Objections
arise, however, when it is interpreted as an empirical proposition. In fact
the (spot) prices of a given commodity will not necessarily be equal in
different locations at a given time. Transport costs andotherobstacles to
trade, in particular tariffs and quotas, do exist and hence the location of
delivery does matter. Therefore we would not expect the price even of an ounce
of gold of a specified fineness always to be the same in New York. and in
Calcutta. The fact that prices of the perfectly homogeneous commodity are not
equalized across space at every point in time does not suggest market failure;
it may simply reflect the inabilitytoshift commodities costlessly and4
instantaneously from one location to the other. Information costs and
impediments to trade stand in the way of strictest spatial equalization of
price. But these impediments to trade do not preclude that common currency
prices of any given good in different locations should be closely related and,
indeed, arbitraged.They just will not be literally equalized. Impediments
to trade and imperfection of competition, of course, also make it possible that
spatial price differentiation can occur thus further limiting strong PPP.
The weak or relative version of PPP therefore restates the theory in terms
of changes in relative price levels and the exchange rate: e =OP/P,where e
is a constant reflecting the given obstacles to trade. Given these obstacles
an increase in the home price level relative to that abroad implies an equi—
proportionate depreciation of the home currency:
4A A
(2)eP_P*
where a Adenotesa percentage change.
Equation (2) is the statement of PPP as it was applied by Gustav Cassel to
an analysis of exchange rate changes during World War I.
"The general inflation which has taken place during the war has
lowered this purchasing power in all countries, though in a different
degree, and the rates of exchange should accordingly be expected to
deviate from their old parities in proportion to the inflation of.
each country. At every moment the real parity is represented by this
quotient between the purchasing power of the money in the one country
and the other. I propose to call this parity "purchasing power
parity". As long as anything like free movement of merchandise and a
somewhat comprehensive trade between the two countries takes place,
the actual rate of exchange cannot deviate very much from this
purchasing power parity." (Cassel, 1918, p.413).
Absolute PPP in (1) was stated in terms of the relative prices in
different currencies and locations of a given and common basket of identical5
goods. Going from there to relative PFP as in (2) may merely be a way of
circumventing the qualifications arising from transport costs or obstacles to
trade. But often more is involved because the shift, in practice, leads to a
use of PPP in terms of particular price indices such as CPIs, WPIs, or GDP
deflators. Once that is done we go beyond the law of one price because the
shares of various goods in the different national indices 'nay not be the same
and the goods that enter the respective indices may not be strictly identical
as is clearly the case for non—traded goods.
Once shares in the indexes are no longer equal and commodities are not
strictly identical the appeal to the law of one price can no longer serve as
support for PPP. Now PPP can only hold, even in the weak form, if the
conditions of the homogeneity postulate of monetary theory are justified. The
homogeneity postulate asserts that a purely monetary disturbance, leaving
unchanged all equilibrium relative prices, will lead to an equiproportionate
change in money and all prices, including the price of foreign exchange. In
this very special experiment PPP holds even if the law of one price does not
apply. The constancy of real variables under the assumption of a purely
monetary disturbance (i.e. an unanticipated, non-recurrent increase in money)
assures that once the economy has adjusted the exchange depreciation matches
the inflation of any individual price or the price of any market basket so that
(2) applies. To appreciate the difference of this experiment with absolute PPP
note that under these conditions (2) could even be stated in terms of indices
on nontraded goods prices.
-
PPPtheory as a theory of equilibrium must be supplemented by an
adjustment mechanism. In the case of identical commodities the theory is
simply that of spatial arbitrage. But when the goods are not strictly
identical more is required. A high degree of substitution in world trade is6
generally assumed to be the mechanism through which exchange rate-adjusted
prices are kept in line internationally. A further point concerns causation.
In much of the literature, especially in the writing of Cassel, exchange rates
adjust to prices. But there is an important alternative tradition that singles
out exchange rate depreciation as an independent source of inflation.
Criticism of PPP focusses on systematic ways in which relative price
changes destroy the strict validity of PPP. Keynes (1923, p.80), although
strongly supporting the idea of PPP as a broad guide, recognized these possible
departures from purely monetary disturbances:
"If on the other hand these assumptions are not fulfilled and
changes are taking place in the 'equation of exchange', as economists
call it, between the services and products of one country and those
of another, either on account of movements of capital, or reparation
payments, or changes in the relative efficiency of labor, or changes
in the urgency of the world's demand for that country's special
products, or the like, then the equilibrium point between purchasing
power parity and the rate of exchange may be modified permanently."
This limitation of PPP led Sainuelson (1964, p. 153) to argue:
"Unless very sophisticated, indeed, PPP is a misleading,
pretentious doctrine, promising what is rare in economics, detailed
numerical prediction."
2. History
Versions of the PPP theory have been traced to the Salamanca school in
16th century Spain and to the writings of Gerrard de Malynes appearing in 1601
in England. The Swedish, French and English bullionists in the second part of
the 18th and in the early 19th century present further statements of PPP.
Particularly noteworthy is the Bullion Report in England (1810, p. ccxxii).
"llhether this 13 1/2 per cent, which stands against this country
by the present exchange on Lisbon, is a real difference of exchange,
occasioned by the course of trade and by the remittances to Portugal
on account of government, or a nominal and apparent exchange7
occasioned by something in the state of our currency, or is partly
real and partly nominal, may perhaps be determined by what your
committee have yet to state."
During the 19th century classical economists, including in particular
Ricardo, Mill, Goschen and Marshall, endorsed and developed more or less
qualified PPP views. This history is reviewed and discussed in Viner (1937),
Schuinpeter (1954), Holmes (1967) and Officer (1984).
Even though PPP theory was well established by the time of World War .1,
the forceful use and develoTxnent of the theory by the Swedish economist Gustav
Cassel, has made him the outstanding protagonist of the theory. He turned the
theory into a paradigm with all the necessary trappings: an alleged challenge
to gold standard orthodoxy, a catchy name, a formula, and the claim of
empirical support for the new view.
Cassel's first contributions on the subject were published in 1916 in the
Economic Journal. He argues the inflation theory of exchange rates and
proceeds to a demonstration using price level and exchange rate data for the
belligerent countries, the U.S., and Sweden. J.M. Keynes as the editor appends
a footnote drawing attention to the contribution and noting his surprise that,
war disturbances notwithstanding, PPP should hold. A further challenge was the
implication of PPP that the pre—war par with gold might not be reestablished or
more guardedly, might require a powerful deflation in a country like Britain.
Cassel never abandoned an uncompromising PPP view of exchange rates even
though he already in 1918 started recognizing the possibility that exchange
rates might transitorily diverge from PPP. A decade later in Cassel(1928a,p.
16) a clear statement of his final position is made:
-"Thefact that the rate of exchange corresponding to Purchasing
Power Parity possesses such a remarkable stability is a sufficient
reason for regarding Purchasing Power Parity as the fundamental
factor determining the rate of exchange and for classifying all other8
factors that may influence the rate and perhaps make it deviate from
the Purchasing Power Parity as factors of secondary importance, most
suitably grouped under the head of 'disturbances' ."
Heidentified three groups of disturbances: actual and expected inflation
or deflation, new hindrances to international trade,and shifts in
international movements of capital. Even though these disturbances are
recognized, their quantitative effect on deviations from PPP is invariably seen
as "confined within rather narrowlimits". (Cassel, 1928a, p.28—29). In
insisting on the proposition that deviations from PPP are limited and
transitory, Cassel neglected paying close attention to the determinants of
purchasing power disparities. Even though he recognized thatinflation first
leads to undervaluation, and stabilization leads later to an overvaluation
(Cassel 1928b, p.26) never took these ideas further. His emphasis was on PPP.
But he points out with some merit (Cassel, 1928b) that without some
quantifiable concept of PPP, a sensible discussion of over or undervaluation
can hardly begin.
Keynes (1923, 1971 Chapter 3) takes up PPP, crediting Elcardo with the
invention and Cassel with the name. Keynes recognized PPP as an
important empirical possibility. Giving it all the right qualifications he
still endorses it for all practical purposes:
"This theory does not provide a simple or ready—made measure of
the 'true' value of the exchanges. When it is restricted to foreign—
trade goods, it is little better than a truism. When it is not so
restricted, the conception of purchasing power parity becomes much
more interesting, but is no longer an accurate forecaster of the
course of the foreign exchanges. Thus defined 'purchasing power
parityt deserves attention, even though it is not always an accurate
forecaster of the foreign exchanges. The practical importance of
our qualifications must not be exaggerated." (Keynes, 1923, p.77—
78).9
Cassel received support for PPP from the monetary disturbances of the
1913—1928 period. Extensive PPP studies were conducted for the U.S.
government (see Young (1925)) andforthe League of Nations. PPP emerged in
the discussion of the resumption of the pre—war gold par in Britain in 1925,
and Jacques Rueff used wage—based PPP to calculate an appropiate par for
France's stabilization under Poincar in 1926—28. But while it became a
regular tool of applied macroeconomics, there was also plenty of controversy.
Viner (1933) challenged the doctrinal view that classical economists had a
concept of PPP, arguing that without the notion of a price level PPP could not
be conceived. In fact Viner had little patience with PPP. The opposition is
easily recognied today: Viner and other critics always reacted to the
overstated claim that PPP must hold as a matter of fact or of theory, pointing
out that only a purely monetary disturbance provided the theoretici or
practical experiment in which PPP would apply. For them PPP as a theory was
simply misstated and as a practical proposition overstated.
A new wave of interest in PPP emerged at the end of World War II when once
again exchange rates had to be set following the war-time suspension of trade
and convertibility. (See Netzler et al, 1947). Renewed interest in PPP
followed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Yeager (1958) and 1-iaberler (1961)
emphasized the practical usefulness of PPP and highlighted the role of high
price elasticities in international trade as the factor supporting PPP. High
elasticities in world trade would assure that real disturbances have only small
effects on relative prices thus establishing more nearly the conditions under
which exchange rate movements reflect dominantly differences in monetary
experiences. Hendrik Houthakker (1962) drew attention to dollar overvaluation,
using absolute PPP calculations based on consumer price comparisons. Samuelson10
in (1964) formalized much of the PPP discussion: while endorsingthe Houthaker
thesis of dollar overvaluatiofl he doubted that a proper test was riven bythe
fact that one could buy cheaper abroad than in the U.S. a givenmarket basket
of goods.
In the late 1930s Harrod had drawn attention to the fact that divergent
international productivity levels could, via their effect on wages and home
goods prices, lead to permanent deviations fromCassel's absolute version of
PPP. This idea was already developed by Ricardo and has become central to work
on international real income comparisons. Balassa(1964) and Samuelson (1964)
elaborated similar ideas to argue that there are systematic trend deviations
from PPP. This "productivity bias" to PPP is discussed in more detail below.
PPP had yet another intellectual upturn with the move to flexible exchange
rates in the early 1970s. The then fashionable "monetary approach to the
balance of payments" developed by Robert Mundell (1968, 1971), Harry Johnson
and their students readily adapted to become a PPP-based monetary approach to
the exchange rate. (See Frenkel and Johnson (1975, 1978) and Mussa (1979)).
The exchange rate under strict PPP conditions was interpreted as a monetary
phenomenon. The absolute version of PPP in (1) above combined with the QTfor
each country (MVPY and M*V* =p*y*)yielded the key equation determining
exchange rates by relative money supplies, velocities and zeal incomes:
(3) e=
Empiricalresearch on the 1 920s and on the very early data ofthe 1 970s
initiallyseemedto lend support to PPP and the monetary approach.
But large movements in real exchange rates of the 1970s led to the
currently dominant PPP skeptcisiri. The new direction following the Mundell—11
Flemingmodel of the 1960s emphasized fluctuations in real exchange rates or
the terms of trade (import relative to export prices) arising from the
discrepancies between flexible, forward looking asset markets and asset prices,
and shortruri sticky prices and wages. Work on exchange rate dynamics
(Dornbusch (1976)) developed these ideas about transitory deviations from PPP
in a rational expectations context.
Concern with PPP continued to be very active in the late 1970s and the
early 1980s. The real exchange rates of the main currencies underwent large,
persistent fluctuations with important effects on trade flows and resource
allocation. At the same time currency experiments in Latin America involved
dramatic real appreciations with ruinous consequences for several countries.
Sometimes in history there was bafflement as to how, all things considered, PPP
could work so closely. This time, however, the surprise was on the other side:
how can real exchange rates get that far out of line? We now review in more
detail the theory of and evidence on deviations from PPP.
3. Purchasing Power Disparities
Qualifications to PPP take one of several forms: departures from PPP can
'be "structural" in the sense that they arise systematically in response to new
and lasting changes in equilibrium relative prices. Alternatively, they occur
in a "transitory" fashion as a result of disturbances to which the economy
adjusts with differential speeds in goods and assets markets. These
qualifications imply that even the weak or relative form of PPP cannot be
expected to hold closely.
These disparities arise primarily for the following reasons: First, the
terms of trade may change as a consequence of changes in trade patterns.
Second, economic growth systematically affects the relative price of home and12
traded goods. Third, monetary and exchange rate changes bring about transitory
deviations in real price ratios and in PPP as a consequence of imperfectly
flexible wages and prices.
Structural Departures: The literature is replete with qualifications to PPP
singling out particular real disturbances that change equilibriumrelative
prices. Thus it has been recognized since Ricardothat real prices of home
goods are high "in countries where manufacturesflourish". It also has been
argued that the "price level is high in borrowingcountries". The Ricardo—
Harrod—Balassa theory provides a framework for these ideas.
Consider a Ricardian model where the law of one price applies to traded
goods and where there is also a home good. With perfect competitionand
constant returns prices are given by unit labor costs. We define as R the
relative consumer price levels of two countries measured in a common currency:
(4) R =P/eP*
With identical homothetic tastes and the law of one price the international
component of price indices is the same in both countries and hence cancels out
in (4). The relative price level is then determined by the relative prices of
home goods in the two countries, measured in a common currency. Let h and h*
be the levels of productivity in traded goods (at the competitive margin)
relative to home goods in each country. It is readily showii (See.Dornbusch,
Fischer and Sa.muelson (1977)) that the relative price level then reduces to:13
(4a) R =R(h/h*),p'>
A uniform rise in traded goods productivity at home would bring about a rise in
the relative price level of the home country or a real appreciation. The
mechanism is the following: with the law of one price applying to traded goods,
increased productivity in the traded goods sector increases wages in that
industry and hence raises economy—wide wages. But without accompanying
productivity gains in the home goods sector, costs and prices there must rise
and hence the growing country's relative price level increases as shown by
(4a).
In (4a) above the national productivity relatives h and h* are measured in
the traded goods sector at the competitive margin. Shifts in technology,
tastes, commercial policies or labor force growth will all change the
equilibrium competitive margin and hence will change the real exchange rate.
Thus real factors, as the literature since Ricardo has recognized, will
introduce systematic departures from PPP. For example a shift in world demand
toward the home country's goods would raise the relative wage and reduce the
range of goods produced by the home country. The rise in the relative wage,
given productivity, raises the relative price level of the home country.
Likewise an increase in spending relative to income (i.e. borrowing or a
current account deficit) will lead to a rise in the relative price level of the
spending country.
A variant of the Bicardian productivity differential model as an
explanation for the relatively low price of non—tradeables in poor countries
has been advanced by Lipsey and Kravis (1983) and Bhagwati (1984). They rely
on differences in factor endowments and factor rewards rather than differences
in production functions. In the poor labor abundant country, the labor-using14
non—traded services can be produced at a relatively low cost compared to the
rich, capital abundant country. Whichever is the model, this effect, as we
will discuss below, has found ample support in empirical research on
international real income and price comparisons.
Transitory Deviations: There is no difficulty in accepting that prices of
close substitutes or even identical goods could diverge across space at any
point in time. This would be the case because, in the shortest time period,
transportation and information costs make arbitrage difficult or even
impossible. These difficulties would explain that PPP holds up to a constant
and white noise error (see Aizerunan (1984)). But in fact we have to explain
relatively persistent and often large deviations from PPP. These can arise
from divergent speeds of adjustment of the exchange rate compared with wages
and prices. Particularly when flexible exchange rates behave like asset prices
while wages are determined by longterm contracts, there is room for relative
prices to show relatively persistent deviations from PPP.
Okun (1981) made the distinction between "auction goods" and "customer
goods". The former are in the nature of homogeneous commodities traded in spot
markets on organized exchanges, the latter are differentiated and marketed in
established customer relations. The former typically have flexible and highly
arbitraged prices, the latter are priced on the basis of normal unit costs and
tend to be sticky. This characterization is implicit in the Mundell—Fleming
model of international capital mobility under flexible exchange rates, which
has been the standard frame of reference for the discussion of open economy
macroeconomics since the 1960s. This model assumes that prices in each country
are fixed and hence exchange rate changes move the terms of trade one for one,
thus bringing about permanent changes in real exchange rates. But even when15
prices are only sticky in the shortrun there will still be relatively
persistent deviations from PPP, although in the lonrun money is fully
neutral.
Theoretical approaches to support the relative stickiness of prices can
rely on the presence of longterm labor contracts combined with oligopolistic
pricing in goods markets. A model of imperfect competition is essential
because the less—than—perfect degree of substitution is a key ingredient in PPP
deviations. less than perfect substitution means that we are not dealing with
the law of one price and arbitrage but with firms' decisions to set relative
prices. A suggestive framework is the Dixit—Stiglitz (1977) model of product
diversification with imperfect competition. Given constant returns and labor
as the only factor each firm will set prices as a fixed and common mark—up over
wages. In the world market for the products of a particular industry the
relative price of domestic and foreign variants of the product is determined by
relative unit labor costs measured in a common currency:
(5)p/ep*=w/ew
where w and w* denote unit labor costs at home and abroad in the repsective
currencies. Given sluggish wages, for contract reasons or otherwise, exchange
rate movements will be one for one reflected in changes in the real exchange
rate.
The assumption that firms base their pricing entirely on home cost, as it
appears in this model, leaves no room for the alternative of spatial price
differentiation. There is yet no definitve or even large body literature that
develops industrial organization aspects of pricing under flexible and
volatile exchange rates.16
npiricalEvidence: There is little doubt that the prices of primary
commodities traded on major organized exchanges in different locations are
fullyarbitragedwhen literally all adjustments for contracts (maturity,
delivery terms and location etc.) are made. Butall available evidence
suggests that PPP in the strong or weak versiondoes not apply in the same
fashionto manufactured goods. The lack of a close conformity with PPP is as
much true for individual commodity prices as it is for aggregate price indices.
Moreover, this absence of a very tight PPP relation appears particularlytrue
during major monetary dislocations.
Studies of high inflation episodes always appear to offer support for PPP
in that they show close cumulative movements of internal prices and the
exchange rate. But even here the evidence is deceptive as becomes clearwhen
one looks at relative prices which do show large variations. Indeed,
particularly during high inflation, the differing frequencies of adjustmentsof
wages, prices and the exchange rate introduce considerable variabilityin
relative prices which only disappears in the most intense stages of
hyperinflation where all pricing comes to be based on the exchange rate.
Kravis and Lipsey (1978) and Isard (1977) have shoim tests of the law of
one price at the level of narrowly defined manufacured goods. The studies
established for the same good (or highly substitutable goods) quite definitely
persistent price discrepancies between domestic and export prices, between
domestic and import prices, and between export prices to different markets.
The evidence on the slack in the law of one price at the level of individual
commodities is sufficently strong for Isard (1977, p.941) to conclude:
'The denial of the law of one price in this context——at the most
diaggregated product level for which price data can be readily
matched——provides a strong presumption that it is impossible to
assemble available data into aggregate price indexes which can be17
expected to obey the law of one price (except, perhaps, when product
coverage is restricted to primary commodities) •0
ipiricalstudies on time series PPP relationships for aggregate rrice
indices in the past twenty years also show evidence of persistent deviations.
Once relative prices are not strictly constant PPP will perform differently
depending on the particular price index chosen for comparison. Commonly the
choice is among CPIs, WPIs, and GDP deflators. WPIs are often ruled out on the
argument that conceptually they are poorly defined being neither producer nor
consumer price indices. The preference is most often given to GDP deflators
that have a clear methodological definition. Figure 1 shows relative GDP
deflatorsexpressed in a common currency in the 1972-83 period for Germany and
forJapan, each relative to theU.S. TheFigure clearly brings outthat
relativeGDP deflators expressed in a common currency are far from constant,
thus refuting the weak version of PPP.
As a measure of the departurefromPPP Table 1 shows the correlationof
annualrates of change of various price indices for the period 1971—83. In
each case the bilateral comparison is conductedon exchange rate adjusted price
indices so that inflation rates are measured in a common currency. The Table
reports correlation coefficients for the CPI, GDP deflator, the GDP deflator
for manufacturing, and export prices of non—electrical machinery. The latter
example is shown as a particular case of a relativelydisaggregated traded
good.The weak form of the PPP hypothesis would predict that the correlation
coefficients are approximately unity. In fact, as is apparent, the values are
far off unity and in many cases even negative.18
Table1:Correlation of Inflation Rates cpressed in U.S. Dollars
Annual data, 1971-1983)
US-Germany US-Japan Germany-Japan
GDP Deflators -0.16 -0.22 0.64






Manufactures -0.10 —0.13 0.61
Table 2 presents correlations of the quarterly rates of inflation ofGDP
deflators(in U.S. dollars) of a wider group of countries for the flexible rate
period 1971—1983. The Table shows once more correlations far off Cassel's
hypothetical value of one. Interestingly even for the more integrated European
countries the correlation is low, though much larger than correlations
involving the United States.
Table 2:Correlations of Inflation Rates Expressed in U.S. Dollars
(GDP Deflators, quarterly data 1971—1983)
U.S. Japan U.K. France Germany
Japan 0.07 1
U.K 0.32 0.32 1
France 0.25 0.50 0.55 1
Germany 0.04 0.49 0.50 0.79 1





















































































































































































The very strong deviations from PPP can likewise be found in looking at
relative prices. Table 3 shows the variablilty of relative GDP deflators,
measured in a common currency and using the U.S. as the nunieraire country. The
data for these relative price variability measures are quarterly and correspond
to the fixed and flexible rate periods. The Table shows a large increase in
variability in the shift to flexible exchange rates.
Table 3: Coefficient of Variation of Relative GDP Deflators
(Quarterly data, deflators measured in common currency)
Germany-US Japan-US UK-US
1960—72 9.0% 9.3% 5.5%
1973:3-83 14.0% 13.4% 17.7%
The evidence on deviations from PPP leaves little doubt that they have
been large and persistent. To pin down the major sources of these movements,
however, is significantly more difficult. Miiong the chief explanations are
capital flows induced by internationally divergent monetary-fiscal mixes
interacting with sluggish wages and prices. Thus it would appear that a
country that shifts in the direction of tight money and easy fiscal policy, for
example, will experience real appreciation.
Besides these dominant macro shocks there is, of course, a host of other
factors. Jacob frenkel (1981a and 1981b, pp.694—695) has noted in this
context:
"The experience during the 1970s illustrates the extent to which
real shocks (oil embargo, supply shocks, commodity booms and
shortages, shifts in the demand for money, differential productivity
growth) result in systematic deviations from PPP. .. Itshould be
noted, however, that to some extent the overall poor performance of
the purchasing power parities doctrine is specific to the 1970s.
During the floating rate period of the 1920s, the doctrine seems to
have been much more reliable."20
WhilePPP failed altogether in the 1970s it is now aprarent that even the
evidence from the 1920s is far from supportive as Krugman (1q78) and Eernholz
(1982) have shown.
Thelackof solid empirical evidence in support of PPP extends to the
assumption that divergent price developments "cause" exchange depreciation.
From the study of experiences of high inflation it is clear that in some
instances capital flight and exchange depreciation precipitated increases in
inflation. In fact Nurkse (1944) makes much of the point that expectations
acting via capital flight on the exchange rate, not actual money and prices,
often initiate inflationary episode.
We conclude with a reference to evidence on structural PPP deviations.
The evidence here establishes quite firmly that over time real exchange rates,
rather than showing constancy or a tendency to fluctuate around a constant
level, in fact exhibit a distinct trend. Productivity levels or real incomes
influence systematically the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods
within a country and hence international relative price levels across countries
and across time.
In the context of an international income comparison project Kravis and
associates have constructed indices of relative national price levels using an
absolute price comparison approach. Drawing on a detailed sample of prices
they construct matched sets of the price of individual commodity groups in a
particular country relative to a reference country. For commodity i the price
relative is p /1 wherethe p's are measured in the respective countries'
currencies with an asterisk denoting the reference country. Using an
arithmetic average with weights a given by final expenditure shares a PPP
index is defined:21
(6) PPPI a(p1/p)
Theexpenditure shares a used in the weighting may be those of either one of
the countries or some other appropriate weighting scheme. With the help of
this PPP index the (Kravis) real price level of a country (relative to the
reference country) is defined as the ratio of the PPP index in (6) divided by
the actual exchange rate:
(7) Kravis Real Price LevelPPP/e
This real price level definition represents a measure of the deviation from the
law of one price at the aggregate level.
Kravis and Lipsey (1983, p.21) report the results of a cross section study
of 34 countries where the 1975 real price level as defined in (7) of the sample
of countries (relative to the U.S.) is explained by the country's real income
compared to the U.S. The evidence shows that the higher is a country's
relative income, the higher is its relative price level. Work by 1-isieh (1982)
using a time series approach further supports the extensive evidence on
divergent productivity trends as a source of structural PPP deviations. It
must be noted, though, that the evidence on structural deviations continues to
be challenged by Officer (1984).
4. Implications of Purchasing Power Disparities:
The fact that exchange rate movements often or even predominantly do not
conform to tight PPP patterns poses important issues for macroeconomic
measurement, linkages, and policy. We review here several implications:22
Real Income Comparisons: With strict PPP based on the law of one price, the
purchasing power of a given income in one country and currency can he compared
with the purchasing power of the income of any other country by simply
measuring incomes in a common currency. If one income is twenty times larger
than the other, measured in the same currency at actual exchange rates, then
its command over goods and services is twenty times larger. But the fact that
PPP does not hold leads to systematic biases in the comparisons. Specifically,
as the work of Kravis and associates (1978, 1982,1983)has shown the real
income of poor countries is severely underestimated when actual exchange rates
are used to make the comparison. The low relative price of non-tradeables in
poor countries (due to the productivity differential discussed earlier) yields
for poor countries true purchasing power of income significantly above what
exchange rate converted income suggests.
Table 4 reports on the magnitude of biases in a sample of 34 countries
separated into six income groups with the U.S. as the numeraire country. Note
that the biases are particularly large for countries whose incomes are only a
small fraction of the U.S. level so that productivity differential effects play
a maximal role. The poorer a country the lower the real price level. An
interesting point is that these real price level differences apply both to
commodities and to services. One reason they also apply to goods is that these
always have a local retail component which on account of labor costs (though
perhaps not transport) will tend to be low in poor countries.23

















1 9.0 3.7 57.2 20.7 40.6
2 23.1 12.1 65.1 34.1 51.7
3 37.3 24.2 83.1 41.2 64.7
4 52.4 38.7 94.0 46.3 73.5
5 76.0 82.3 119.0 94.6107.5
U.S. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0
Source:Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982).
The ratio of dollar income to real income for each group (column 2 divided
by column 1) represents the extent to which exchange rate conversions
understate real income. For low income countries actual real income is two to
three times what exchange rate-converted incomes suggest. These structural
deviations from PPP, of course, would be invariant under a purely monetary
disturbance so that the weak form of PPP would still apply.
Interest Rate Linkages and PPP: Under perfect international mobility of
capital and risk neutral speculation there is a linkage between nominal
interest rates and the anticipated rate of depreciation which is given
by the open economy sher equation:
(8)i=i*+x
where i and i are the nominal interest rates at home and abroad and x is the
anticipated rate of depreciation of the home currency. Adding and subtracting24
anticipated inflation rates on both sides yields an equation in terms of
inflation—adjusted or real interest rateo:
(8a)r*r+/R
Real interest parity, according to (8a) prevails when the real interest
differential equals the expected rate of real appreciation, /R. Prom the
real interest parity condition it is apparent that under exact PPP the real
exchange rate is constant. In the absence of restrictions on capital flows,
real interest rates must therefore be strictly equalized across countries.
The real interest parity equation has two interesting implications. A
first one is the linkages between the level of real exchange rates and
monetary policy. Suppose that in a medium-term macroeconomic context,
following a disturbance, the actual real exchange rate adjusts only gradually
to the trend level R according to the process: 1/R =(l/a)(R'—R).Here 1/a
is the speed of adjustment which depends among other things on the extent to
which wages and prices are sticky. Combining this process with (8a) yields
an equation for the equilibriimi real exchange rate:
(9)R =R+a(r_r*)
The result shown here is that when real interest rates at home exceed those
abroad the real exchange rate will be appreciated relative to its trend
value. A tightening of monetary policy, by raising real interest rates would
thus bring about a (transitory) real appreciation. Equation (9) emerges from
the dynamic Nundell—Fleining models and is often thought to explain realexchange rate movements and their tendency to cnly return gradually to their
long run value.
A second way to look at (8a) draws on the fact that the traded—nontraded
goods distinction has implications for real exchange rates. Suppose the law
of one price holds for traded goods and that shares in the two countries' price
indices are the same. Then as argued before, the real exchange rate is equal
to the relative price of nontraded goods (in a common currency) in the two
countries. Structural disturbances such as differential productivity growth
or changes in aggregate demand will now have a systematic impact on relative
nontraded goods prices and hence on real interest rate differentials.
Specifically the country with the higher growth rate of productivity has a
rising relative price of home goods and thus has a lower real rate of interest.
As another example in a country where aggregate demand is transitorily high has
a home goods prices are is high but falling. Accordingly the real interest
rate is high relative to that abroad. Deviations from PPP, trend or shortrun,
thus introduce an equilibrium international interest rates differential.
PPP deviations affect interest differentials another way. In (a) above we
assumed risk neutrality. But once risk averse speculators are admitted, the
possibility that exchange rate movements could deviate from a strict PPP
pattern introduces portfolio risk associated with the currency composition of
the portfolio. PPP deviations are thus a basic motive for international
portfolio diversification. A risk premium will appear and among the
determinants of this premium is the variability of the real exchange rate.
The risk premium will be an increasing function of real exchange rate
uncertainty. (See the survey in Branson and Henderson (1984)).
Finance theory—oriented literature has posed the important question
whether deviations from PPP imply economic inefficiency (see Roll (1979)).26
Inefficiency means that a rational speculator, using available information,
could make excess profits by borrowing in one country and buying spot and
holding a commodity basket representing the foreign country's CPI. If the rate
of real depreciation predictably exceeds the real rate of interest in a
country, there exists the possibility that markets are inefficient. For
example an investment in foreign goods would yield a real rate of return in
terms of domestic goods equal to —/R. An investment in home financial assets
yield an expected real return r. Let the random differential between these two
investments be K r + /R. Finance theory predicts that in an information-
rational market Kt E(KtIIti) + u where Ut IS a white noise error
uncorrelated with any information 't—i available at time t—1. Hence a
regression of Kt on variables known at time t—1 will not yield a statistically
significant coefficient, nor serial correlation in the errors. The evidence
does not lend unambiguous support to this efficiency hypothesis, possible
explanations being risk premia arid the obvious difficulty of storing the CPI.
(See Cumby and Obstfeld (1984)).
Exchange Rate Policy: In Cassell's view even small deviations from PPP would
bring about large changes in trade flows and hence a rapid discipline to move
prices back into line internationally. But the reversion toward PPP has often
not been quick and deviations from PPP have taken more nearly the pattern of
persistent swings in a country's external competitiveness. The changes in
conipetitiveness in turn have implied large swings in external balances, in
output and in employment in the traded goods sector. Changes in exchange rates
that deviate from PPP at the same time influence the path of a country's
inflation: real depreciation increases inflation and real appreciation dampensinflation. These effects of purchasing power disparities make the exchange
rate an important issue in macroeconomic policy.
Countries with high inflation cannot afford a fixed exchange rate since
the loss in external competiveness would soon lead to excessive and growing
external deficits and large unemployment. If freely fluctuating rates are
deemed too unstable the policy answer is often a crawling peg. In a crawling
peg regime the rateS of depreciation follows a PPP path suchthat over time the
real exchange rate remains constant.(See Williamson (1965, 1982)). Such a
policy is an important advance over a system of occasional devaluations (too
little, too late), but it is not without risks for two reasons. First,
freezing the real exchange rate may be a bad policy when disturbances in fact
call for a path of, say, real depreciation. Second, there is a trade—off
between stability of the real exchange rate and price stability. A policy of
fully accommodating any and all price or cost disturbances by an offsetting
depreciation may in fact remove price stability altogether (see Dornbusch
(1 982)).
PPP issues enter exchange rate policy also when a country seeks to gain
macroeconomic advantages by a deliberate policy of driving the exchange rate
away from PPP. A real depreciation serves to gain competitiveness and shift
employment toward the depreciating country. In the 1930s this was called a
"beggar—thy-neighbor" policy and in post World War II Fhirope it became "export—
led growth." A policy of appreciation by contrast serves to reduce
inflationary pressure as the rate of increase of traded goods prices is pushed
below the prevailing rate of inflation. These macroeconomic effects of
purchasing power disparities are not difficult to bring about: easy money, in
the short and medium term, serves to depreciate the exchange rate and thus
create employment. This policy is more effective and more lasting the more28
stickywages and the smaller the connection between wages, prices and the
exchangerate. By contrast, in an economy that is strongly indexed and in
particular with exchange rate influences on indexation, an attempt at creating
employment via easy money would be frustrated as exchange depreciation
precipitates off-setting wage and price inflation.
Deviations from PPP have also been used as a disinflation policy. (See
Fischer (1984)). Deliberate fixing of the exchange rate or preannounced rates
ofdepreciation below the prevailing rates of inflation, have been adopted in
various countries to break inflation. The experience has been almost uniformly
disappointingand worse. The resulting overvaluation very often has led to
excessive external deficits, borrowing and capital flight and ultimately only
moderate success at disinflation. The cases of Chile and Argentina in the late
1970s were particularly extreme. Exchange rate policies led to extreme
overvaluation. But these economies had been opened to unrestricted trade or
free capital flows. The public therefore could speculate against the
overvalued currency by massive imports or capital flight while the governments
financed the resulting deficits by external borrowing. In the end the scheme
collapsed leaving the private sector with foreign goods or foreign assets and
the governments with huge foreign debts.
PPP disparities are relevant for the exchange rate choice between
flexible and fixed or managed rates. In a world where exchange rate
movements conform strictly to PPP and monetary policy governs prices there is
no issue. flexible rates then allow a country to chose its preferred rate of
inflation. But once disparities are possible both as a result of structural
trends andperhapsas a consequence of short term capital movements, the fixed
versus flexible rate choice becomes more difficult. Flexible rates are
preferable because there is no risk that the government pegs a rate that no29
longer corresponds to equilibrium. But flexible rates suffer the handicap that
disequilibratiflg capital flows can drive the real exchange rate away from the
level warranted by the fundamentals of the goods market. In particular if
exchange rates respond more to asset markets than price levels, persistent real
appreciation or depreciation become a possibility. Figure 1 above is
suggestive of such disequilibrium movements. When these do occur there is
invariably a call for PPP-based foreign exchange market intervention to bring
rates back to "fundamentals". Explicit target zones have been proposed as a
means of maintaining the advantages of flexible rates within limits to maintain
approximate PPP. (See Williamson(1983)).
Flexible rates are also a concern because disequilibrating capital flows
can provoke large changes in the rate of inflation. A loss of confidence,
whether warranted or not, induces a capital outflow and a real exchange
depreciation. If domestic financial policies are linked via the budget or
indexation to the exchange rate the real depreciation can initiate a sharp
increase in inflation. Much of the discussion of the merits of flexible
rates has concentrated on the question of whether speculative capital flows
"cause" the inflation or whether they merely respond to an inflationary
situation, bringing about exchange depreciation in line with prevailing
inflation. The Graham-Nurkse—Robinson view asserts, contrary to Milton
friedman, that destabilizing capital flows are the central element in the
outbreak of major inflation experiences. Exchange stabilization, similarly, is
seen as an essential step in stopping a run-away inflation and-initiating a
stabilization program.
PPP is also relevant in the context of devaluation of a fixed rate. In
the monetary approach to the balance of payments a firm tenet is the
proposition that a devaluation cannot exert a lasting effect on relative30
prices or the balance of trade. Ecchange depreciation raises the prices of
all traded goods in the same proportion and any effect then must be limited
to a temporary depression of home goods prices due to reduced absorption. As
money responds to the external surplus, real absorption rises and the initial
real equilibrium is restored. This approach has the disturbing implication
that devaluation does not appear to be an effective means of coping with trade
or employment problems. In practice a devaluation will work well when it is
+r un+h nR i,1!,+m11+fr,m iu cr.i1--i is-i anh,, 14h,.-,,
situationwhere wages arid prices are less than fully flexible downward. But a
devaluation is likely to be ineffective if it is accompanied by a monetary
expansion and wage increases, thus eliminating any real effects.
5.ConcludingRemark.
PPP remains an essential element of open economy macroeconomics for two
reasons. First it is a benchmark by which to judge the level of an exchange
rate. Cassel argued that without PPP there would be no meaningful way of
discussing over or undervaluation. That recognition has found a very
concrete expression in the real exchange rate series now routinely calculated
and reported by governments, international organizations and financial
institutions. These series show exchange rate adjusted price relatives for a
country relative to its trading partners. The series are constructed on the
basis of GDP deflators, unit labor costs, manufacturing prices and wholesale
prices for all major industrialized countries and increasingly for developing
countries, too. They are used to judge changes in a country's external
competitiveness thus implicitly assuming, as Cassel did, that movements in
equilibrium relative prices are negligible. Changes in real exchange rates31
then (and only then) unambiguously translate into changes in competitiveness
from which to expect changes in trade flows and net exports.
There is no question that these data provide a useful benchmark for
policy discussion. But the objections remain the same that have been brought
over the past seventy years. For example from 1978 to 1984 the U.S. dollar
appreciated on a trade weighted basis in real terms by 25 percent using GDP
deflators in manufacturing as the basis of comparison. How much of this real
appreciation represents a movement away from fundamentals? The base year,
1978, may have represented an excessive undervaluation. Furthermore macro and
micro structural changes may have increased the equilibrium relative price of
U.S. goods. With the present state of knowledge it is difficult to judge
whether the overvaluation is ten or twenty percent and hence to decide whether
there is a major market failure calling for intervention.
The second use of PPP istoserve as a prediction model for exchange
rates. Under perfectly flexible wages and prices a monetary expansion would
lead to equi—proportionate increases in wages, prices and the exchange rate,
leaving all real variables unchanged. This combination of the QT and PPP is an
important insight in guiding policy. Expansionary monetary policy can only be
effective if wages and prices are less than fully flexible and will be more
effective the more flexible the exchange rate. The essential channel is the
real depreciation of the exchange rate that serves to create employment, at
least for a while. Similarly, exchange depreciation can only be effective if
money wages and prices are unresponsive. Policy can be effective only if PPP
fails to hold. Macroeconomic theory goes increasingly in the direction of
information,contracting, and pricingmodels toexplore what isthebasis of
PPP failure and to determine the resulting extent and persistence of policy
effects.32
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